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Abstract	Gregor	Mendel’s	paper	"Experiments	on	Plant	Hybrids"	(1866)	has	become	a	paradigmatic	case	in	the	historiography	of	the	life	sciences	because	production	and	reception	of	a	“discovery”	sharply	fell	apart,	thus	raising	fundamental	questions	about	the	relationship	between	scientific	achievement	and	“its”	time.	In	this	chapter,	I	am	providing	an	overview	of	answers	that	have	been	given	to	these	questions	by	various	historians.	In	a	first	section,	I	cover	commentators	who	have	claimed	that	Mendel	was	“ahead”	of	his	time,	and	that	contemporaries	failed	to	recognize	his	achievement.	I	then	move	on	to	scholars	and	scientists	who	argued	against	this	position,	claiming	that	Mendel	was	not	anticipating	twentieth-century	genetics,	but	was	in	fact	representative	of	an	older	research	tradition.	In	a	last	step,	I	turn	to	the	more	recent	cultural	history	of	heredity	according	to	which	Mendel	was	embedded	in	a	local	culture	that	combined	a	variety	of	advanced	and	traditional	strands	of	nineteenth-century	life-sciences.	Overall,	I	am	arguing	that	one	should	not	overestimate	the	coherence	and	dominance	of	presumed	“paradigms”,	“epistemes”	or	“styles”	in	biology.		 	
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Ihr	Lettern,	meines	Forschens	Sprossen	...2	Gregor	Mendel,	1830s	
Introduction	
There	is	no	doubt	that	Gregor	Mendel	was	a	child	of	the	nineteenth	century.	In	1822,	he	was	born	into	a	family	of	ethnically	German	small	holders	in	Hynčice	(German:	Heinzingen)	in	northeastern	Moravia	(today	Czech	Republic),	joined	the	Augustinian	Abbey	St.	Thomas	in	Brno	(Brünn)	in	1843,	received	a	thorough	education	in	natural	sciences	at	Vienna	University,	and	finally	rose	to	the	position	of	abbot,	which	he	held	until	his	death	in	1884.	Like	countless	contemporaries,	he	was	a	keen	naturalist,	joined	local	associations	for	natural	history	and	the	promotion	of	agriculture	and	industry,	and	published	occasional	notes	and	essays	on	agricultural	pests,	plant	hybridization,	and	meteorology.	Nothing	in	Mendel’s	biography—including	perusal	of	the	Emperor	Ferdinand	
Northern	Railway	to	visit	the	libraries	of	Vienna	and	participation	in	a	group	tour	to	see	the	Great	Exhibition	in	London	in	1862—points	beyond	the	intellectual	
																																																								2	First	line	from	a	poem	that	Gregor	Mendel	sketched	in	the	late	1830s	during	his	time	at	the	gymnasium	of	Opava	(Troppau).	It	can	be	translated	as	“Oh	letters,	rungs	of	my	research	...”;	the	poem	celebrates	Johannes	Gutenberg’s	invention	of	movable	print.	Quoted	from	Iltis	(1924,	14).	
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horizon	of	a	polyglot	citizen	of	the	Austro-Hungarian	Empire	and	active	participant	in	the	vibrant	culture	of	industrializing	central	Europe.3	
And	yet,	the	historiography	of	the	life	sciences	has	usually	portrayed	Mendel	as	being	out	of	step	with	his	time,	either	by	making	him	out	as	the	“founding	father”	of	genetics,	a	quintessentially	twentieth-century	discipline,	or	by	portraying	him	as	a	late	representative	of	“hybridism”,	a	research	tradition	in	the	plant	sciences	deeply	rooted	in	eighteenth-century	species	fixism.	These	divergent	interpretations	are	due	to	what	is	often	called	“the	long	neglect”	of	Mendel’s	main	literary	achievement—a	forty-seven	pages	long	report	on	hybridization	experiments	with	pea	and	other	plant	varieties	that	was	published	in	1866.	The	aim	of	this	publication,	as	Mendel	himself	put	it,	was	to	establish	“a	generally	valid	law	for	the	formation	and	development	of	hybrids.”4	Yet,	with	some	exceptions,	this	publication	went	unnoticed	until	1900.	In	that	year,	three	botanists—Hugo	de	Vries	(1848–1935),	Carl	Correns	(1864–1933),	and	Erich	von	Tschermak	(1871–1962)—claimed	to	have	independently	“rediscovered”	the	law	that	Mendel	had	presumably	laid	down	already.	Within	a	few	years,	his	paper,	as	well	as	the	eponymous	laws,	became	widely	known	among	biologists	as																																																									3	For	Mendel’s	biography,	see	Iltis	(1924,	English	translation	1966);	Orel	1996;	and	Klein	(2013).	I	will	rely	on	Orel	for	biographical	details	throughout	this	chapter.	
4	Mendel	(2016a,	p.	3,	s.	6).	There	exist	several	English	translations	of	Mendel’s	essay	(Mendel	1901;	Mendel	1902;	Mendel	1966;	Mendel	2016b).	I	am	quoting	from	the	latest	critical	edition	and	translation,	citing	page	and	sentence	number.	The	phrase	“long	neglect”	can	be	traced	back	to	Glass	(1953,	p.	148).	
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providing	the	foundations	for	the	new	discipline	of	genetics,	a	discipline	that	was	perceived	to	hold	revolutionary	potential	for	controlling,	manipulating	and	understanding	life.	Since	then,	the	thirty-four	years	of	silence	around	Mendel’s	paper	have	either	been	made	out	as	a	tragic	case	of	oversight	that	hampered	scientific	progress,	or	else	as	a	phantasm	resulting	from	anachronistic	projections	of	later	scientific	developments	onto	earlier	episodes	in	its	history.5	
Given	the	curious	fate	of	Mendel’s	paper,	it	comes	as	no	surprise	that	it	is	one	of	the	most	heavily	scrutinized	texts	in	the	historiography	of	biology—almost	certainly	second	only	to	Darwin’s	On	the	Origin	of	Species	(1859)—and	that	the	resultant	body	of	scholarly	work	is	ruptured	by	passionate	debates	about	what	it	was,	exactly,	that	Mendel	discovered,	and	what	place	this	discovery	occupies	in	the	longue	durée	history	of	the	life	sciences	in	general,	and	the	history	of	heredity	more	specifically.	No	less	than	three	substantive	review	articles	are	available,	which	chart	the	evolving	landscape	of	these	historiographical	debates	throughout	the	twentieth	century.	Their	authors—Robert	C.	Olby,	Jan	Sapp,	and	Vítezslav	Orel	(1926–2015)—fall	themselves	on	different	sides	of	the	debates,	and	yet	agree	in	one	fundamental	point:	They	all	portray	the	debates	as	arising	from	a	divorce	between	scientist	historians	looking	back	at	the	origins	of	their																																																									5	On	references	to	Mendel’s	paper	before	1900,	see	Olby	and	Gautrey	(1968).	On	its	„rediscovery“	in	1900,	see	Jahn	(1958),	Olby	(1985,	ch.	6),	Rheinberger	(1995),	Stamhuis	et	al.	(1999),	Harwood	(2000)	and	Simunek	et	al.	(2011).	Olby	(1985,	219–234)	provides	English	translations	of	some	sources	mentioning	Mendel	before	1900.	On	the	history	of	Mendelian	genetics,	see	Dietrich,	this	volume.	
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discipline	and	professional	historians	of	science	deconstructing	the	resultant	“origin	myths”.6		
This	chapter	proposes	that	this	picture	of	a	divorce	between	scientist	and	professional	historians	involves	elements	of	mythmaking	itself.	Whether	or	not,	and	if	yes,	in	what	sense	Mendel	can	be	seen	as	having	brought	about	a	breakthrough	in	understanding	heredity	has	also	been	debated	among	scientists,	for	the	simple	reason	that	the	science	of	heredity,	its	aims,	methods,	and	core	assumptions,	was	understood	and	evaluated	very	differently	by	different	schools	and	generations	of	scientists.	Mendel’s	paper	became	a	paradigmatic	case	in	the	history	of	science	not	simply	because	its	historical	meaning	was	contested,	but	more	specifically	because	production	and	reception	of	a	“discovery”	sharply	fell	apart	in	this	case,	thus	raising	fundamental	questions	about	the	relationship	between	scientific	achievement	and	“its”	time.	In	the	following,	I	am	going	to	provide	an	overview	of	answers	to	these	questions.	I	will	first	cover	commentators	who	have	claimed	that	Mendel	was	“ahead”	of	his	time,	and	that	contemporaries	failed	to	recognize	his	achievement.	I	will	then	move	on	to	scholars	and	scientists	who	argued	against	this	position,	claiming	that	Mendel	was	not	anticipating	twentieth-century	genetics,	but	was	in	fact	representative	of																																																									6	Sapp	(1990,	p.	146);	Orel	and	Hartl	(1994,	p.	445);	Olby	(1997,	sect.	“Scientific	Disciplines”).	All	three	review	articles	are	accessible	online	at	MendelWeb	(www.mendelweb.org),	an	internet	resource	created	by	Roger	B.	Blumberg	in	1995,	but	not	updated	since	1997.	It	offers	a	wealth	of	other	useful	material,	including	the	German	original	and	Bateson’s	1902	translation	of	Mendel’s	paper	for	download.	
	 6	
an	older	research	tradition.	In	a	last	step,	I	will	turn	to	those	who	have	held	that	both	of	these	positions	rest	on	a	false	dichotomy	and	that	Mendel	was	embedded	in	a	local	culture	that	combined	a	variety	of	advanced	and	traditional	strands	of	nineteenth-century	life-sciences.	Overall,	I	am	going	to	argue	that	one	should	not	overestimate	the	coherence	and	dominance	of	presumed	“paradigms”,	“epistemes”	or	“styles”	in	biology.	Life,	as	well	as	the	scientific	disciplines	that	study	it,	are	just	too	indeterminate	and	inchoate	to	develop	in	such	an	orderly	fashion.	
	
Mendel	Ahead	of	His	Time	
The	historiography	of	Mendel	begins	with	his	three	rediscoveres.	All	of	them	acknowledged	his	priority,	and	added	that	his	paper	had	“fallen	into	oblivion”	(de	Vries),	had	“hardly	attracted	any	interest”	(Correns),	or,	as	Tschermak	put	it,	only	had	come	to	light	after	its	“simultaneous	‘discovery’	by	Correns,	de	Vries	and	myself.”7	Yet,	already	in	this	epochal	moment	in	the	history	of	heredity,	disagreements	about	how	to	read	Mendel	became	apparent.		
De	Vries	was	the	first	to	announce	the	“discovery”	of	Mendel	in	a	“preliminary	note”	that	he	had	submitted	for	publication	on	March	14,	1900,	to	the	German	journal	Berichte	der	deutschen	Botanischen	Gesellschaft.	Without	much	ado,	he	
																																																								7	Vries	(1900,	85),	Correns	(1900,	159)	and	Tschermak	(1900,	239).	English	translations	of	de	Vries’s	and	Correns’	papers	can	be	found	in	Stern	and	Sherwood	(1966,	107–138),	but	I	am	here	providing	my	own.		
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brought	Mendel	into	the	fold	of	his	own	mutation	theory,	claiming	that	Mendel	had	only	shown	for	a	“special	case	(peas)”	what	he,	de	Vries,	had	been	able	to	establish	with	“general	validity,”	namely	1)	that	hybrids	show	one	of	two	“antagonistic	characters”	only	(what	is	sometimes	called	the	law	of	dominance)	and	2)	that	these	characters	“separate	in	the	formation	of	pollen	and	egg	cells”	(the	law	of	segregation).8		
Correns	followed	suit,	with	a	paper	submitted	to	the	same	journal	on	April	24.	With	thinly	veiled	sarcasm,	he	stated	that	he	had	not	“considered	it	necessary	to	secure	priority	for	a	‘post-discovery’	[‘Nach-Entdeckung’].”	Against	de	Vries,	Correns	argued	on	the	basis	of	actual	quotations	from	Mendel’s	paper	that	the	latter	had	not	formulated	two	laws,	but	only	one,	which	stated		“that	the	hybrids	produce	germ-	and	pollen	cells	that	correspond	in	equal	quantities	to	all	the	constant	forms	that	emerge	from	the	combination	of	the	traits	that	were	united	by	fertilisation.”	What	de	Vries’	called	the	“law	of	segregation”	(Spaltungsgesetz)	was	actually	included	by	this	law,	whereas	de	Vries’s	law	of	dominance	was	simply	fictitious	and	had	never	been	endorsed	by	Mendel.9		
Tschermak	went	even	further	in	dissociating	Mendel	from	any	particular	“laws”	of	inheritance.	His	contribution	to	the	Berichte,	submitted	on	June	2,	did	not	embark	on	an	interpretation	of	Mendel’s	original	paper,	but	simply	took	his	
																																																								8	Vries	(1900,	84–85).	
9	Correns	(1900,	166–68).	Correns	quotes	Mendel’s	own	formulation	of	the	alleged	law;	cf.	Mendel	(2016a,	p.	29,	s.	4).	
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empirical	results	for	granted.10	A	year	later,	however,	Tschermak	published	the	first	scholarly	edition	of	Mendel’s	paper	in	a	renowned	book	series	of	classical	contributions	to	natural	science.	According	to	him,	all	that	Mendel	had	shown	was	that	traits	of	organisms	differ	regularly	in	their	“valency”	(Werthigkeit),	and	that	they	do	so	in	three	respects:	heritability,	number	of	individual	carriers,	and	degree	of	expression	of	traits.11	His	account	of	how	Mendel	had	been	forgotten	now	showed	a	slight	change	in	wording.	Mendel’s	paper	had	not	been	“discovered”	but	rather	“‘rediscovered’”	(“wiederentdeckt”;	quotation	marks	in	the	original).12	It	is	likely	that	he	took	over	this	curious	locution	from	the	British	botanist	William	Bateson,	who	mentioned	“de	Vries’s	papers	announcing	the	‘rediscovery’	and	confirmation	of	Mendel’s	law”	in	the	published	version	of	a	paper	presented	to	the	Royal	Horticultural	Society	on	May	8,	1900.	Bateson	also	used	the	phrase	“simultaneous	rediscovery”—now	without	quotation	marks—about	half	a	year	later	in	an	introductory	note	that	preceded	the	first	English	translation	of	Mendel’s	paper.13	
It	is	worth	contemplating	these	details	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	various	uses	of	the	term	“discovery,”	and	especially	its	derivatives,	as	well	as	the	frequent	use	of	quotation	marks	indicate	that	it	is	a	very	slippery	term,	even,	and	perhaps																																																									10	Tschermak	(1900,	235).	
11	Tschermak	(1901,	54).	In	the	second	edition	(1911),	Tschermak	changed	his	mind,	and	presented	Mendel	much	more	in	line	with	what	we	today	would	consider	as	conventional	Mendelism.	
12	Ibid.,	55.	
13	Bateson	(1900–1901,	60);	Mendel	(1901,	2).	
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especially,	to	scientists.	Not	only	does	it	seem	that	scientific	discoveries,	just	like	films,	can	experience	“remakes”;	the	meaning	of	the	term	also	shifts	back	and	forth	between	uncovering	a	timeless	fact	of	nature	and	lifting	a	past	effort	to	describe	such	a	fact	from	the	vast	archives	of	modern	science.	Sociologist	of	science	Augustine	Brannigan	has	argued	for	an	“attributional	model	of	scientific	discovery,”	according	to	which	priority	disputes,	but	more	importantly	scientific	debates	about	how	best	to	interpret	phenomena,	provide	the	social	context	in	which	“certain	happenings”	are	declared	“discoveries”,	and	the	“simultaneous	rediscovery”	of	Mendel	by	de	Vries,	Correns	and	Tschermak	served	him	as	a	paradigmatic	case.14	My	point	here	is	a	different	one,	though,	namely	that	such	processes	of	attribution	also	generate	among	scientists	what	I	suggest	to	call	a	“spontaneous”	history	of	science.	Even	for	scientists,	facts	of	nature	are	inextricably	bound	up	with	texts	that	try	to	communicate	them,	and	these	texts	never	simply	speak	for	themselves,	but	always	need	historical	uncovering	and	interpretation	to	reveal	their	proper	meaning.15	
Given	the	central	role	genetics	played	in	twentieth-century	life	sciences,	it	therefore	does	not	come	as	a	surprise	that	Mendelian	scholarship,	to	this	day,	has	heavily	depended	on	contributions	from	scientists.	Virtually	all	the	archival	sources	we	possess	from	Mendel	have	been	unearthed	and	edited,	often	with	an	accompanying	scholarly	apparatus,	not	by	historians	of	science,	but	by	scientists:																																																									14	Brannigan	(1979,	450).		
15	The	French	Marxist	philosopher	Louis	Althusser	suggested	that	the	“spontaneous	philosophy	of	scientists”	could	provide	an	antidote	to	the	tendency	of	philosophy	“to	speak	about	nothing	but	itself”	(Macherey	2009,	19).	
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Tschermak	and	Bateson,	as	already	mentioned,	edited	and	translated	his	original	paper,	and	Correns	soon	followed	with	an	edition	of	the	letters	Mendel	wrote	to	prominent	Swiss	botanist	Carl	Naegeli	(1817–1891).16	The	centennial	of	Mendel’s	paper	saw	another	two	critical	editions,	with	accompanying	materials	and	commentary	by	geneticists	R.	A.	Fisher	(1890–1962)	and	Curt	Stern	(1902–1981)	respectively,	and	in	the	same	year	the	Czech	poultry	geneticist	Jaroslav	Kříženecký	(1896–1964)	produced	a	transcription	of	Mendel’s	original	fair	copy.17	Even	the	few	handwritten	annotations	that	have	come	down	to	us	from	Mendel’s	readings	and	experiments	were	brought	to	light	by	scientists	like	the	embryologist	Sir	Gavin	de	Beer	(1899–1972),	Dutch	botanist	and	conservationist	Jacobus	Heimans	(1889–1978)	or	German	viticulturalist	Franz	Weiling	(1909–1999)—not	to	speak	of	the	countless,	and	often	obscure,	primary	sources	that	support	the	three	biographies	of	Mendel,	all	of	them	composed	by	scientists.18	
These	efforts	did	not	simply	aim	to	celebrate	Mendel	as	the	“founding	father	of	genetics”.	What	was	also	at	stake,	as	we	have	seen	with	the	rediscoverers,	were	fundamental	questions	relating	to	the	nature	of	Mendel’s	discovery.	In	a	classic	essay,	which	appeared	in	the	first	issue	of	the	journal	Annals	of	Science	(1936),	the	statistician	R.	A.	Fisher	formulated	these	questions	succinctly:	“What	did	Mendel	discover?	How	did	he	discover	it?	And	what	did	he	think	he	had	
																																																								16	Correns	(1905);	Naegeli’s	responses	to	Mendel	are	lost.	
17	Bennett	(1965);	Stern	and	Sherwood	(1966);	Kříženecký	(1965,	57–92).	
18	Beer	(1964);	Heimans	(1970);	Weiling	(1992).	On	Mendel	biographies,	see	note	2.	
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discovered?”19	And	Fisher	was	all	but	naïve	about	the	prospect	of	deciding	these	questions	on	an	entirely	objective	basis.	His	essay	was	in	fact	the	first	historiographical	contribution	to	Mendelian	scholarship,	and	came	to	the	oft-quoted	conclusion	that		
Each	generation,	perhaps,	found	in	Mendel's	paper	only	what	it	expected	to	find;	in	the	first	period	a	repetition	of	the	hybridization	results	commonly	reported,	in	the	second	a	discovery	in	inheritance	supposedly	difficult	to	reconcile	with	continuous	evolution.	Each	generation,	therefore,	ignored	what	did	not	confirm	its	own	expectations.	Only	a	succession	of	publications,	the	progressive	building	up	of	a	corpus	of	scientific	work,	and	the	continuous	iteration	of	all	new	opinions	seem	sufficient	to	bring	a	new	discovery	into	general	recognition.20	
The	target	of	this	conclusion,	and	of	the	article	as	a	whole,	was	a	complex	one.	It	included	those	(the	“first	generation”)	who	allegedly	had	only	been	interested	in	the	empirical	verification	of	Mendel’s	experimental	results,	but	also	those	(the	“second	generation”)	who	had	offered	a	particular	theoretical	reading	of	these	results.	Fisher’s	argument	was	therefore	twofold.	On	the	one	hand,	he	rejected	the	idea—prominently	defended	by	Bateson	in	the	polemical	context	of	what	came	to	be	known	as	the	“Mendelism-Biometry	debate”21—that	Mendel	had	
																																																								19	Fisher	(1936,	137).	
20	Fisher	(1936,	137).	
21	Bateson	(1902).	This	was	the	first	book-length	critical	study	of	Mendel’s	paper,	and	a	second	revised	edition	appeared	in	1909.	
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been	opposed	to	Darwin,	that	Mendel’s	main	achievement	had	been	to	disprove	continuous	variation,	and	that	the	dominance	of	Darwinian	ideas	had	been	responsible	for	his	neglect.	On	the	other	hand—and	now	following	up	on	earlier	clues	from	Bateson—,	Fisher	proposed	that	Mendel	did	not	at	all	proceed	empirically,	as	a	superficial	reading	of	his	paper	might	suggest.	Instead,	he	had	constructed	his	experiments,	as	well	as	the	account	he	gave	of	them	(including	some	manipulation	of	data	to	fit	expectations),	in	order	to	produce	“a	carefully		planned		demonstration		of		his	conclusions.”22	Both	lines	of	argument	chimed	well	with	Fisher’s	own	contributions	to	the	so-called	“Modern	Synthesis”	of	Mendelian	genetics	with	the	Darwinian	theory	of	natural	selection	on	the	one	hand,	and	to	the	foundations	of	mathematical	population	genetics	on	the	other.23	
Fisher’s	essay	extended	the	“long	neglect	of	Mendel”	by	another	full	thirty	years.24	If	nineteenth-century	researchers	had	overlooked	his	results,	and	what	these	revealed	about	the	mechanism	of	inheritance,	early	twentieth-century	Mendelians	had	misunderstood	his	unique	approach,	which	combined																																																									22	Fisher	(1936,	124).	Whether	Mendel,	consciously	or	not,	„falsified“	his	data	to	produce	results	that	were	„too	good	to	be	true“	has	been	the	subject	of	a	fierce	debate	among	statisticians,	geneticists	and	historians	of	science	that	continues	to	this	day;	see	Franklin	et	al.	(2008)	for	a	collection	of	important	contributions	to	this	debate.	The	allegation	of	data	manipulation	was	not	new	when	Fisher	wrote	his	article.	Bateson’s	main	opponent,	the	biometrician	Raphael	Weldon	(1860–1906),	had	actually	raised	it	in	1902	already;	see	Radick	(2015).	
23	On	the	Modern	Synthesis,	see	Borello,	this	volume.	
24	Beer	(1964).	
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experiment	with	mathematical	treatment,	and	had	failed	to	see	that	it	was	compatible	with	Darwinian	natural	selection.	Mendel	thus	turned	into	the	paradigm	case	of	a	scientist	who	fell	out	of	the	discursive	boundaries	drawn	by	scientific	communities.	In	1953,	American	geneticist	H.	Bentley	Glass	produced	a	map-like	diagram	for	his	contribution	to	a	Festschrift	honoring	Arthur	O.	Lovejoy,	the	“father”	of	the	history	of	ideas.	Bearing	the	title	“The	Chain	of	Ideas	from	Goethe	and	Oken,	Who	Represent	the	Naturphilosophie,	to	Modern	Genetics,”	it	did	not	even	include	Mendel	who,	as	Glass	supposed,	lay	“out	to	the	side	of	all	these	streams	of	thought.”25	
For	the	history	of	heredity	more	generally,	this	portrayal	of	Mendel	as	a	lone	and	mis-	or	not-at-all	understood	researcher	had	a	curious	consequence.	Books	dedicated	to	this	subject,	up	until	the	mid-1960s,	were	of	two	kinds.	They	were	either	histories	of	genetics,	taking	their	starting	point	in	1900,	the	year	of	rediscovery;26	or	they	were	histories	of	“precursors”	to	Mendelism,	choosing	the	same	year	as	their	vanishing	point.27	Alongside	this,	there	existed	a	literature	that	dealt	separately	with	a	related	subject:	the	history	of	generation.28	All	of	these	studies	retain	their	value,	both	for	their	sophistication	and	the	wealth	of	material	they	contain.	The	three	strands	would	only	be	brought	together,	however,	after	the	Long	Neglect	story	had	been	seriously	challenged	in	the	late	1970s.																																																									25	Glass	(1953,	158).		
26	Carlson	(1966);	Sturtevant	(1966).	
27	Roberts	(1929);	Stubbe	(1965);	Robinson	(1979).	
28	Lesky	(1951);	Roger	(1963/1998);	Gasking	(1967).	
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Mendel	Stuck	in	Time	
While	not	themselves	contributing	to	historical	scholarship,	sociologists	and	philosophers	of	science	in	the	first	six	decades	of	the	twentieth	century	were	quick	to	pick	up	the	story	of	Mendel’s	neglect	and	subsequent	parallel	rediscovery.	Cultural	Anthropologist	Alfred	L.	Kroeber	(1876–1960)	used	it	in	his	article	“The	Superorganic”	(1917)—in	which	he	argued	for	the	independence	of	cultural	evolution	from	the	biological	and	psychological	evolution	of	individuals—to	point	to	the	“the	inexorable	fate	in	store	for	the	discoverer	who	anticipates	his	time”,	and	such	references	became	routine	with	later	sociologists	and	anthropologists	intrigued	by	the	phenomenon	of	multiple	and	roughly	simultaneous	discoveries	and	inventions.29	In	the	French	tradition	of	historical	epistemology,	references	to	Mendel	and	his	rediscovery	were	made	just	as	routinely.	Thus,	Michel	Foucault	(1926–1984)	proclaimed	in	his	inaugural	lecture	at	the	Collége	de	France,	held	on	2	December	1970,	that	Mendel	had	spoken	“of	objects,	employed	methods	and	placed	himself	within	a	theoretical	perspective	totally	alien	to	the	biology	of	his	time”,	and	that	it	would	require	a	“whole	change	in	scale,	the	deployment	of	a	totally	new	range	of	objects	in	biology	...	before	Mendel	could	enter	into	the	true	[dans	le	vrai]	and	his	
																																																								29	Kroeber	(1917,	198);	Ogburn	and	Thomas	(1922);	White	(1949).	Robert	K.	Merton	(1910–2003),	in	his	classic	article	on	multiple	discoveries	(1961),	considered	the	“case	of	Mendel”	as	“too	well	known”	to	even	expand	on	it	any	further;	see	Merton	(1996,	308).	
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propositions	appear,	for	the	most	part,	exact.”30	In	the	same	year,	molecular	biologist	François	Jacob	published	his	magisterial	Logic	of	Life:	A	History	of	
Heredity,	in	which	Mendel,	once	more,	but	now	in	greater	detail,	was	credited	as	having	introduced	an	entirely	new	approach	to	biology—as	well	as	constituting	a	new	object,	the	gene—by	focusing	on	discrete	character	pairs	in	his	experiments	and	analyzing	their	results	with	the	help	of	combinatorial	analysis	and	statistics.31	
All	of	these	accounts	do	not	divorce	scientific	achievements	from	contemporary	contexts;	quite	on	the	contrary,	the	point	of	telling	Mendel’s	story	was,	and	often	still	is	today,	to	demonstrate	how	powerful	prevailing	discursive	contexts	are	in	advancing,	or	else,	obstructing	innovation.	The	only	way	to	counter	this	story,	without	falling	back	into	sheer	positivism,	was	to	say	that	the	story	itself	was	simply	wrong;	that	Mendel	had,	in	fact,	not	discovered	what	he	was	supposed	to	have	discovered	sixteen	years	after	his	death;	that	he	had	not	been	a	“lone	genius”	but	a	well-connected	naturalist;	and	that	he	had	not	been	neglected	at	his	time	but	received	due	attention	from	his	peers.	In	other	words,	what	was	called	for	was	a	new	reading	of	relevant	historical	sources	for	hints	that	would	root	Mendel	firmly	within	traditions	of	nineteenth-century	biology.	
																																																								30	Foucault	(1971,	16).	The	quoted	passages	rely	heavily	on	earlier	work	by	Foucault’s	mentor	Georges	Canguilhem	(1904–1995);	see,	e.g.,	Delaporte	(1994,	37,	51).	
31	Jacob	(1970/1996,	202–9).	
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Helpfully,	Mendel	himself	was	quite	explicit	in	placing	himself	within	such	traditions.	Not	only	did	he	list	predecessors	in	the	first	paragraph	of	his	paper,	but	he	also	concluded	it	with	a	critical	review	of	their	experiments	(again,	an	exercise	in	“spontaneous	history”).32	In	a	book	that	appeared	in	the	centennial	year	1966,	alongside	the	two	new	English	editions	of	Mendel’s	paper	mentioned	above,	Olby	followed	up	these	references	in	a	two-pronged	attack	on	the	received	view	of	Mendel.	Not	only	did	he	show	that	Mendel	had	been	working	in	a	long-established	and	well-defined	older	research	tradition	which	dealt	with	hybridization,	rather	than	heredity	as	such,	and	dated	back	to	a	hybridization	experiment	carried	out	in	1759	by	the	Swedish	naturalist	Carl	Linnaeus	(1707-1778);	it	also	turned	out	that	heredity	as	a	research	subject	of	its	own	was	not	so	much	defined	by	Mendel,	nor	by	Charles	Darwin	who	remained	a	“life-long	generation	theorist”,	but	by	the	likes	of	Francis	Galton	(1822–1911)	and	August	Weismann	(1834–1914).33	
Olby	was	the	first	professional	historian	of	science	to	write	a	monographic	account	of	Mendel	and	the	history	of	inheritance.	As	he	recalls	in	the	second																																																									32	Mendel	(2016a,	38–47).	Interestingly,	this	last	section	was	left	out	from	what	became	the	most	popular	English	edition	of	Mendel’s	paper.	It	originally	appeared	as	an	appendix	in	Castle	(1916,	281–321),	and	was	then	reprinted	as	an	inconspicuous	brochure	by	Harvard	University	Press	until	1965.	This	may	be	why	Zirkle	(1951,	99),	otherwise	a	very	attentive	scientist	historian,	claimed	that	“Mendel	himself	described	none	of	the	earlier	research”.	
33	Olby	(1966,	10).	On	Darwin	as	a	“life	long	generation	theorist”,	see	Hodge	(1985).	
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edition	of	his	book,	Origins	of	Mendelism	had	grown	out	of	a	PhD	thesis	project	he	had	undertaken	with	population	geneticist	and	historian	of	science	Alistair	Crombie,	who	later	became	known	for	transferring	the	concept	of	“style”	from	the	study	of	art	to	the	study	of	science	and	its	history.	Aware	of	his	own	“‘Whiggish’,	‘presentist’	...	tendencies”	in	the	first	edition—that	is,	tendencies	to	select	and	evaluate	protagonists	and	events	in	the	history	of	science	in	view	of	their	contributions	to	the	current	state	of	art.34—Olby	aimed	to	shift	emphasis	in	his	amended	second	edition	“away	from	a	positivist	and	empiricist	interpretation	of	the	history	of	genetics	and	toward	a	constructivist	view	in	which	knowledge	is	seen	as	under-determined	by	the	facts,	their	meaning	being	dependent	to	an	important	extent	upon	the	theoretical	presuppositions	of	the	observer.”35	This	shift	in	emphasis	was	already	evident	in	a	highly	influential	journal	article	Olby	had	published	in	1979.	It	bore	the	provocative	title	“Mendel	no	Mendelian?”	and	turned	far	more	explicitly	against	“inflated	whiggish	interpretations”	of	Mendel	that	were	prevalent	among	scientists	and	in	the	popular	press.	Relying	on	Paul	Forman’s	classical	study	of	mythmaking	in	the	historiography	of	X-ray	crystallography,	Olby	surmised	that	the	“orthodox	view”	of	Mendel	as	the	founding	father	of	genetics	had	originated	and	continued	to	prevail	because	“geneticists	and	plant	breeders	have	introduced	mythical	elements	into	their	reconstructions	of	the	history	of	genetics	which	historians	have	failed	to	identify	and	reject.”36	
																																																								34	See	Jardine	(2003)	for	critical	reflections	on	the	concept	of	“Whig	history”.	
35	Olby	(1985,	xi–xiv).		
36	Olby	(1979,	53–54).	
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Less	polemical	in	substance	than	this	may	sound,	and	flanked	by	the	sociological	analysis	Brannigan	provided	in	the	same	year,	“Mendel	no	Mendelian?”	provided	ample	historical	evidence	for	a	new	assessment	of	Mendel’s	achievements	that	inspired	a	whole	new	generation	of	Mendelian	scholarship.	A	consensus	emerged	over	the	long	run	that	Mendel	had	certainly	not	endorsed	the	particulate	view	of	genetic	factors	that	was	promoted	by	mid	twentieth-century	population	and	molecular	genetics,	and	also	had	not	formulated	his	“laws”	in	the	same	way	as	modern	biology	text-books	do	to	this	day.37	But	controversy	persisted	regarding	the	question	how	far	back	in	history	Mendel	should	eventually	be	pushed.	Some,	including	Olby,	argued	that	Mendel	was	fully	up	to	date	with	current	problems	in	contemporary	cell	and	evolutionary	biology,	but	failed	to	convince	his	peers	that	he	had	come	up	with	a	plausible	solution.38	Others,	among	them	evolutionary	biologist	Ernst	Mayr	in	a	review	of	Olby’s	book,	identified	an	element	of	outdated	essentialism	in	Mendel	and	sometimes	even	went	as	far	as	claiming	that	he	had	written	his	essay	specifically	to	disprove	Darwin’s	theory	of	natural	selection.39	Olby	captured	the	two	sides	in	this	controversy	nicely,	by	speaking	of	the	“Darwinian”	and	the	“Linnaean”	Mendel.40		
For	the	history	of	heredity	more	generally,	Olby’s	intervention	signaled	the	end	of	accounts	that	assumed	that	heredity	was	an	obvious	problem	only	waiting	for	its	eventual	solution	by	Mendel	and	the	Mendelians.	Jacob	had	already	made	the																																																									37	Kampourakis	(2015).	
38	Campbell	(1982);	Olby	(1985,	ch.	5);	Sandler	and	Sandler	(1985).	
39	Mayr	(1973);	Callender	(1988);	Bishop	(1996).	
40	Olby	(1997),	sect.	IV,	„Mendel	and	the	Darwinians“.	
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forceful	point	in	1970	that	heredity	was	a	relatively	late	conceptual	product	of	modern	biology,	and	that	its	history	formed	a	complex	landscape	of	evolving	and	competing	disciplinary	formations.	Each	“stage”	in	the	history	of	heredity	was	characterized	by	a	whole	series	of	conceptual,	technological	and	methodological	breakthroughs	that	made	new	domains	of	enquiry	accessible	to	researchers,	but	also	limited	them	to	a	“range	of	possibilities	defined	not	only	by	current	theories	and	beliefs,	but	also	by	the	very	nature	of	the	objects	accessible	to	investigation,	the	equipment	available	for	studying	them	and	the	way	of	observing	and	discussing	them.”41	While	disagreeing	with	Jacob’s	very	general,	transdisciplinary	periodization,	evolutionary	biologist	Ernst	Mayr	(1904–2005)	produced	a	similar	account	in	his	Growth	of	Biological	Thought:	Diversity,	
Evolution,	and	Inheritance	(1982).	Like	Jacob,	he	saw	biological	disciplines	going	through	“periods	of	stagnation	and	periods	of	greatly	accelerated	advance.”42	Placing	emphasis	much	more	exclusively	on	conceptual	shifts	than	Jacob,	Mayr	told	the	history	of	heredity	through	shifts	along	conceptual	dichotomies—from	essentialism	to	population	thinking,	from	preformation	to	epigenesis,	from	soft	(or	Lamarckian)	to	hard	inheritance,	from	blending	to	non-blending	inheritance—that	have	profoundly	influenced	subsequent	discussions	among	historians	and	philosophers	of	biology.43	
Despite	this	influence,	or	rather	just	because	of	it,	Mayr	attracted	substantial	criticism	from	professional	historians	of	science	for	what	they	perceived	as	his																																																									41	Jacob	(1970/1996,	11).	
42	Mayr	(1982,	127).	
43	Burkhardt	(1994);	Müller-Wille	(2011).	
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“Whiggish”	tendency	to	focus	selectively	on	the	history	of	those	ideas	that	would	eventually	shape	twentieth-century	theories	of	evolution.44	A	good	example	is	Peter	J.	Bowler’s	popular	book	on	the	history	of	hereditarianism,	entitled	The	
Mendelian	Revolution:	The	Emergence	of	Hereditarian	Concepts	in	Modern	Science	
and	Society	(1989).	Bowler	agreed	that	the	“advent	of	Mendelism	represented	...	a	conceptual	revolution	of	major	proportions.”45	But	drawing	inspiration	from	Thomas	S.	Kuhn’s	theory	of	paradigm	change	and	the	Edinburgh	School’s	“strong	program”	in	sociology	of	knowledge,	he	emphasized	the	social	and	ideological	dimensions	of	this	revolution.	Especially	eugenics,	which	had	hardly	played	any	role	in	Jacob’s	and	Mayr’s	histories	of	heredity,	was	thus	foregrounded	as	a	major	force	in	promoting	hereditarian	ideas,	while	Mendel’s	original	contribution	receded	into	the	background	of	the	countless	efforts	in	late	nineteenth-century	biology	to	conceptualize	heredity	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	“developmentalist”	or	“pre-Mendelian”	paradigm	that	did	not	yet	separate	clearly	between	transmission	and	development.	“[N]ew	laws	or	theories	are	not	simply	‘discovered’,”	Bowler	insisted	against	scientist	historians,	but	“invented	to	satisfy	the	cultural	values	of	the	scientists	and	of	the	public	with	whom	they	interact.”	Mendel’s	paper	had	simply	failed	to	conform	to	these	values	at	the	time	when	it	was	published,	but	happened	to	do	so	thirty-four	years	later.46	
																																																								44	Bowler	(1988).	For	a	defense	against	these	attacks,	see	Mayr	(1990).	
45	Bowler	(1989,	7).		
46	Bowler	(1989,	7,	44,	and	94–95).	Ironically,	Bowler	relied	on	an	earlier	explanation	of	the	“long	neglect”	that	had	been	proposed	by	two	geneticists,	Iris	and	Laurence	Sandler;	see	Bowler	(1989,	108).	
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The	Many	Times	of	Mendel	
The	idea	that	Mendel’s	“discovery”	was	an	invention,	or	fabrication	even,	met	stubborn	resistance	above	all	from	one	Mendelian	scholar:	Vítězslav	Orel	(1926–2015).	Orel	was	a	student	of	Kříženecký’s,	and	played	an	important	role	in	preparing	the	1965	Gregor	Mendel	Memorial	Symposium	in	Brno,	which	was	organized	by	the	Czech	Academy	of	Sciences	with	sponsorship	from	international	organizations	such	as	UNESCO,	the	International	Union	of	Biological	Scientists	and	the	International	Atomic	Energy	Agency.	The	Symposium	attracted	an	international	audience	of	scientists,	including	Conrad	H.	Waddington	(1905–1975),	Nikolay	Timofeev-Ressovsky	(1900–1981),	as	well	as	Jacob,	Stern	and	Stubbe	as	speakers.47	Subsequently,	Orel	became	the	Director	of	the	Mendelianum—a	museum	dedicated	to	Mendel’s	life	and	work	on	the	premises	of	the	monastery	in	Brno—,	head	of	a	research	unit	on	Mendel	at	the	Agricultural	University	in	Brno,	and	Editor	of	a	journal	entirely	devoted	to	Mendelian	scholarship,	the	Folia	Mendeliana.	He	held	these	positions	until	his	retirement	in	1990,	but	continued	to	publish	on	Mendel	until	his	death	in	2015,	often	in	co-authorship	with	anglophone	scientists	and	historians.48	
																																																								47	Sosna	(1966,	vii–xi).	The	conference	proceedings	are	available	from	the	Wellcome	Library’s	Digital	Collections	(URL=https://wellcomelibrary.org/item/b18019900).	
48	Paleček	(2016).	Due	to	complex	local	developments	in	post-communist	Brno,	there	are	two	Mendel	museums	now	in	Brno.	The	Mendelianum	was	moved	to	the	Moravian	Museum,	while	a	new	Mendel	Museum	sponsored	by	the	Masaryck	
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It	is	tempting	to	dismiss	Orel’s	life-long	insistence	that	Mendel	was	the	“first	geneticist”	as	a	sign	of	the	hero	worship	that	scientists	easily	fall	prey	to,	and	that	Olby	and	Bowler	criticized	so	incisively.	But	the	Gregor	Mendel	Memorial	Symposium	was	not	just	any	commemorative	event.	It	had	been	organized	to	achieve	the	symbolic	“rehabilitation”	of	Mendelism	in	the	Communist	Block	after	the	official	downfall	of	Lysenkoism	(and	Nikita	Khrushchev)	in	1964.49	In	order	to	make	this	happen,	it	was	essential	to	secure	a	substantial	connection	between	Mendel	as	a	historical	figure	of	local	significance	in	Brno,	then	part	of	the	Communist	Block,	and	twentieth-century	genetics	as	an	international	science.	And	something	else	needed	to	happen.	Just	like	the	Soviet	theoretical	physicist	Boris	Hessen	(1893–1936)	had	exposed	the	social	and	ideological	“roots”	of	Isaac	Newton’s	Principia	in	1931	in	order	to	fend	off	accusations	in	his	home	country	that	the	pursuit	of	“pure”	science	was	economically	and	ideologically	useless,	it	had	to	be	shown	that	Mendel’s	work	as	well	was	firmly	grounded	in	progressive	technological	and	political	developments	of	his	time.50	
																																																																																																																																																														University	was	established	in	the	monastery.	Folia	Mendeliana	continuous	to	appear	(see	http://www.mzm.cz/en/folia-mendeliana/),	but	its	contents	are	unfortunately	not	yet	available	online.		
49	Orel	(2005).	„Rehabilitating“	Mendel	was	not	just	an	academic	question:	Kříženecký	lost	his	university	position	in	1948	and	even	spent	eighteen	months	in	jail	in	1958	(Orel	1992).	At	around	the	same	time,	Orel	lost	his	job	as	head	of	the	poultry	research	unit	at	the	Agricultural	University	in	Brno	(Paleček	2016).	
50	On	Hessen,	see	Freudenthal	and	McLaughlin	(2009).	
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Orel,	as	well	as	the	many	contributors	he	recruited	for	Folia	Mendeliana,	did	this	to	great	effect.	Their	collective	efforts	revealed	that	Mendel	was	not	only	firmly	grounded	in	hybridism,	but	operated	at	the	intersection	of	several	additional	strands	of	nineteenth-century	scientific	culture:	Through	his	training	at	the	University	of	Vienna	under	the	physicist	and	mathematician	Christian	Doppler	(1803–1853),	Mendel	was	familiarized	with	methods	of	analytic	experimentation	involving	the	application	of	combinatorial	analysis	and	probability	theory.	His	life-long	interest	in	meteorology,	documented	in	several	publications,	additionally	deepened	his	understanding	of	methods	in	descriptive	and	predictive	statistics.	At	the	university	of	Vienna,	he	was	exposed	to	the	teachings	of	botanist	Franz	Unger	(1800–1870)	who	promoted	a	“physics	of	the	plant	organism”	that	involved	experimentation	and	the	search	for	mathematical	laws	governing	the	distribution	of	organisms	in	space	and	time,	and	throughout	his	life,	Mendel	moved	in	intellectual	circles	that	discussed	evolution	also	for	its	political	implications	(tensions	between	German	and	Czech	nationalists	were	running	high	in	the	Year	of	Revolution	1848).	Unger	was	also	teaching	cell	theory,	and	a	visit	by	Jan	Purkyňe	(1787–1869)	to	Brno	in	1850	contributed	further	to	Mendel’s	very	advanced	understanding	of	fertilization	and	plant	development.	Finally,	membership	in	the	Brno	Sheep-Breeders	Society	immersed	Mendel	in	long-standing	debates	among	local	naturalists,	farmers	and	industrialists	about	breeding	methods	and	inheritance.	These	dated	back	to	the	early	nineteenth	century,	and	Mendel’s	predecessor	as	abbot,	Cyril	Napp	(1792–1867),	played	a	leading	role	in	them.	The	monastery	was,	in	fact,	one	of	the	biggest	players	in	the	thriving	economy	of	Brno—the	“Manchester	of	Central	
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Europe,”	as	contemporaries	called	it—and	it	was	Napp	who	actively	encouraged	Mendel	to	pursue	his	hybridization	experiments.51	
What	is	crucial	about	these	different	strands	is	the	fact	that	they	were	independent	of	each	other	and	that	each	had	its	own	time	of	birth,	flourishing	and	decline.	While	nineteenth-century	biologists	in	the	late	nineteenth-century	did	not	clearly	separate	between	hereditary	transmission	and	development,	breeders	already	engaged	in	a	well-articulated	discourse	of	heredity	in	its	first	few	decades.52	Doppler’s	experimental	methods	were	developed	in	the	1830s,	but	such	methods	only	began	to	infiltrate	biology,	especially	developmental	mechanics	and	biochemistry,	in	the	very	late	nineteenth	century.53	“Austro-Ungerian”	botany	had	seen	its	heyday	in	the	1840s	and	1850s,	but	continued	to	be	influential	until	it	waned	with	increasing	acceptance	of	Darwinian	evolution,	just	as	hybridism	did.54	Questions	regarding	the	cytological	basis	of	sexual	reproduction	and	inheritance,	in	contrast,	were	only	beginning	to	be	asked	at	Mendel’s	time	and	the	field	would	only	see	its	“watershed	moment”	in	the	1880s.55	These	strands	were	largely	independent	of	each	other	and	fail	to	form	a	coherent	paradigm,	and	depending	on	which	one	accepts	as	a	benchmark,																																																									51	Orel’s	biography	(1996)	continues	to	be	the	best	guide	to	the	large	body	of	literature	on	these	different	strands.	The	first	volume	of	Klein’s	biography	(2013)	adds	much	interesting	detail	about	the	German-Czech	context	of	Mendel.	
52	Wood	and	Orel	(2000,	2005).	
53	Allen	(2002).	
54	Gliboff	(1999);	Radick	(2011).	
55	Farley	(1982);	Churchill	(1987)	(Dröscher	(2015).	
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Mendel	appears	as	“ahead”	or	“backward”	in	time.	Their	conjunction	in	Mendel’s	work,	by	contrast,	was	certainly	unprecedented	and	remained	unique.	
On	occasion	of	his	retirement,	Orel	described	his	scholarly	accomplishment	as	having	“pointed	out	the	achievements	of	Mendel	in	the	special	cultural	milieu	of	this	country	[i.e.,	Czechoslovakia].”56	And	indeed,	particularly	his	work	on	Mendel’s	background	in	breeding	resonated	very	well	with	a	whole	wave	of	projects	on	the	cultural	history	of	heredity	that	were	initiated	in	the	early	2000s.	Various	factors	motivated	these	projects.	There	was	first	of	all	the	general	shift	within	the	discipline	of	history	of	science	towards	a	focus	on	local	contexts	of	knowledge	production	and	the	processes	of	communication	and	translation	that	connect	these.57	Secondly,	and	concomitantly,	eugenics	and	agricultural	biology	had	become	subjects	of	serious	historical	scrutiny	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	suggesting,	as	Bowler	had	most	prominently,	that	any	history	of	heredity	not	attending	to	relevant	developments	in	the	political,	medical	and	agro-industrial	sphere	would	be	essentially	incomplete.58	Thirdly,	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	inheritance	as	a	concept	in	both	the	social	and	the	life	sciences	entered	a	crisis	in	the	early	2000s,	raising	the	prospect	that	non-genetic,	“alternative”	inheritance	systems	might	again	move	center-stage	in	the	sciences.59	Writing	the	history	of	heredity	was	a	way	to	escape	the	conceptual																																																									56	Matalova	(1992,	118).	
57	Shapin	and	Ophir	(1991);	Dear	(1995);	Secord	(2004).	
58	Russell	(1986);	Allen	(1991);	Olby	(1993);	López	Beltrán	(1994).	On	the	history	of	eugenics,	see	Weindling,	this	volume.	
59	Keller	(2000).	
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grip	that	the	history	of	genetics	had	had	on	its	historiography.	And	it	is	no	coincidence	that	historians	embarked	on	this	project	precisely	in	the	moment	when	biologists	as	well	began	to	explore	inheritance	beyond	genetics.60	
A	whole	range	of	essay	collections	and	book-length	studies,	which	paint	a	varied	and	complex	picture	of	the	history	of	pre-Mendelian	heredity,	has	resulted	from	this	re-orientation.61	In	terms	of	methods	and	approaches,	the	cultural	history	of	heredity	is	quite	diverse,	if	not	to	say,	amorphous.	But	there	are	a	few	shared	features,	such	as	a	focus	on	the	metaphors	used	to	describe	reproductive	processes.	“Heredity”	itself	is	a	concept	that	was	imported	from	legal	discourses	into	the	life	sciences,	and	it	does	not	appear	to	have	come	into	general	use	in	its	biological	sense	before	the	nineteenth	century.62	Historians	of	law,	as	well	as	historians	of	literature	who	have	looked	at	expert	and	non-expert	discourses	of	succession	and	transmission	of	land,	privileges,	titles	and	money,	have	therefore	provided	important	input	to	the	cultural	history	of	heredity,	especially	by	drawing	attention	to	the	multiplicity	and	complexity	of	ways	in	which	property	(and	properties)	are	transmitted	in	different	historical	and	cultural	contexts.63		
An	emphasis	on	heterogeneity	also	characterizes	the	literature	on	the	cultural	history	of	heredity	that	has	more	narrowly	focused	on	conceptions	of	inheritance	
																																																								60	See,	e.g.,	Jablonka	and	Lamb	(2005).	
61	For	an	attempt	at	a	synthetic	overview,	see	Müller-Wille	and	Rheinberger	(2012).	
62	López	Beltrán	(2004a);	cf.	Radick	(2012).	
63	Weigel,	Willer	and	Jussen	(2013);	see	also	Gayon	and	Wunenberger	(1995).	
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within	the	life	sciences.	When	biologists	like	Darwin	and	Galton	first	began	to	look	into	heredity	in	the	mid	nineteenth-century,	they	relied	on	empirical	knowledge	from	very	different	sources:	breeders’	tracts	on	the	uses	(and	dangers)	of	in-	and	outbreeding	domestic	animals;	medical	treatises	like	the	
Traité	philosophique	et	physiologique	de	l’hérédité	naturelle	(1847–51),	in	which	the	French	“alienist”	Prosper	Lucas	(1814–1899)	discussed	the	inheritance	of	mental	disease	in	two	hefty	volumes;	or	the	burgeoning	literature	in	physical	anthropology,	anthropometry	and	human	statistics	that	had	emerged	out	of	the	eighteenth-century	tradition	of	a	“natural	history	of	mankind.”64	Bowler	was	right,	then,	to	place	emphasis	on	what	he	called	the	“Mendelian”	revolution;	it	was	indeed	the	late	nineteenth	century	in	which	heredity	was	consolidated	as	a	widely	recognized	subject	of	research,	speculation	and	explicit	debate.	Unlike	Bowler,	however,	more	recent	studies	have	highlighted	theoretical	pluralism	and	coexistence	of	a	diversity	of	research	traditions,	rather	than	discursive	closure	as	a	key	characteristic	of	this	period.65	
Finally,	despite	their	focus	on	local	contexts	of	knowledge	production	and	transmission,	cultural	studies	of	heredity	have	also	promoted	a	renewed	attention	to	the	longue	durée	of	heredity	in	its	various	incarnations.	Thus,	for	some	very	specific	contexts—such	as	medical	theories	explaining	familial	diseases,	the	breeding	of	domestic	animals,	and	political	and	legal	debates	about	the	status	of	nobility—,	it	has	been	possible	to	trace	hereditarian	ideas	as	far	
																																																								64	Müller-Wille	and	Rheinberger	(2007).	
65	Rheinberger	(2008);	Kampourakis	(2010).		
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back	as	the	early	fourteenth	century.66	Continuities	proliferate,	and	extend	back	even	further	to	the	ancient	world,	inside	and	outside	of	Europe,	if	one	casts	the	net	wider,	and	shifts	the	focus	from	the	concept	of	heredity	to	the	broader	category	of	reproduction,	hence	including	disciplines	like	gynecology	and	demography.67	It	is	medical	practice	and	theory,	in	particular,	with	its	inherent	political	dimension	of	governing	life	for	the	sake	of	health	and	its	consequent	exposure	to	the	contingencies	and	accidents	of	“real”	life,	that	challenges	the	historian’s	imagination	with	a	bewildering	array	of	co-existing	conceptions	of	heredity,	both	“ancient”	and	“modern,”	at	any	point	of	its	history.68	
Seen	against	this	background,	modern	hereditarian	ideas	appear	less	specifically	tied	to	the	name	of	Mendel,	but	rather	associated	with	the	long-drawn	processes	of	nation	state	formation,	the	rise	of	capital	and	industrialization,	as	well	as	European	colonialism	and	imperialism.69	The	story	of	Mendel’s	“long	neglect”	thus	appears	less	and	less	as	a	focal	historiographical	riddle.	Nothing	about	the	sciences	of	heredity	before	1900	seems	to	exclude	Mendel	as	“abnormal”,	nor	predetermine	his	“rediscovery”	as	founding	father	of	a	new	science	at	the	beginning	of	the	new	century.	It	has	therefore	become	conceivable	to	think	of	Mendel’s	innovation	as	firmly	grounded	in	the	hybridist	tradition,	and	yet	taking																																																									66	Lugt	and	Miramon	(2008).	
67	Hopwood,	Flemming	and	Kassell	(in	press).	
68	Gaudillière	and	Löwy	(2001);	Gausemeier,	Müller-Wille	and	Ramsden	(2013);	Gausemeier	(2014).	
69	López	Beltrán	(2004b);	Müller-Wille	(2007);	Waller	(2012);	Müller-Wille	and	Brandt	(2016);	Porter,	in	press.	
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it	a	crucial	step	further	by	creating	an	experimental	system	that	later	Mendelians	could	exploit	productively.70	“Mendel’s	discovery”,	in	all	its	different	senses,	was	the	result	of	thoroughly	contingent	circumstances	that	fail	to	fit	with	a	clear	taxonomy	of	“paradigms”,	“epistemes”	or	“styles”.	In	the	light	of	current	epigenetics	and	theories	of	extended	inheritance,	it	therefore	seems	perfectly	possible,	that	other	inheritance	mechanisms	than	genetic	transmission	could	have	been	foregrounded	in	the	life	sciences	at	the	beginning	of	the	last	century,	and	to	raise	the	counterfactual	question	how	twentieth-century	life	sciences	would	have	developed	if	Mendelian	views	of	inheritance	had	not	prevailed.71	In	other	words:	The	central	historiographical	riddle	for	the	historian	of	heredity	today	with	regard	to	“Mendel’s	discovery”	is	not	anymore	why	it	was	neglected	but	how	it	could	have	happened	at	all. 
	
Outlook	
“History	is	...	never	history,	but	history-for”	according	to	anthropologist	Claude	Lévi-Strauss.72	We	do	not	tell	stories	to	the	dead,	but	for	our	contemporaries	and	in	reaction	to	present	situations	that	have	been	shaped	by	past	events	but	do	not	represent	them.73	Writing	history	is	therefore	an	inherently	anachronistic	practice	and	conditioned	by	assumptions	about	the	historicity	of	the	subject	of																																																									70	Müller-Wille	and	Orel	(2007);	Rheinberger	and	Müller-Wille	(in	press).	
71	Radick	(2016).	
72	Lévi-Strauss	(1962/1966,	257).	
73	Collingwood	(1994).	
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our	choice.74	Ever	since	Hessen’s	exacting	demand	to	understand	Newton	“in	his	time”,	it	has	become	commonplace	for	historians	of	science,	and	eventually	part	of	their	professional	identity,	to	accuse	“scientist”	historians,	and	each	other,	of	anachronisms.	But	what	defines	the	time	scale	against	which	anachronism	is	to	be	determined	remains	a	wide-open	question	that	will	be	answered	differently	by	different	historians.	From	this	perspective,	it	can	be	as	anachronistic	to	call	Mendel	a	“Linnaean”	as	it	may	be	to	call	him	“the	first	geneticist”.	
This	does	not	mean	that	any	historical	account	is	legitimate.	Misrepresenting	sources,	ignoring	their	contexts,	and	falling	back	on	facile	teleological	explanations	is	bad	practice,	in	history	as	much	as	in	politics.	What	it	means,	though,	is	that	we	should	not	be	surprised	that	developments	in	the	sciences	themselves,	among	many	other	factors,	can	precipitate	major	changes	in	perspective	in	the	history	of	science,	as	I	have	argued	for	the	“cultural	history	of	heredity”	in	the	last	section	of	this	chapter.	The	opening	up	of	biology	for	a	plurality	of	inheritance	systems	in	the	last	two	decades	has	drawn	attention	to	a	whole	range	of	potential	areas	of	historical	inquiry	into	heredity	that	we	still	know	far	too	little	about	and	that	I	want	to	outline	in	conclusion.	
One	of	the	ironic	results	of	the	long-lasting	fixation	with	Mendel	is	that	we	know	little	about	the	wide	variety	of	hereditarian	ideas	around	1900,	and	especially	their	legacy	in	the	twentieth	century.	The	little	we	do	know	has	emerged	from	the	study	of	debates	between	Mendelians	and	other	schools	of	thought	and	
																																																								74	Canguilhem	(1966/2005).	
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practice	like	the	Biometricians	or	proponents	of	cytoplasmic	inheritance.75	But	studies	of	continuing	traditions	within	embryology,	cytology	or	biochemistry	in	their	own	right	are	relatively	rare,	as	are	studies	that	trace	back	contributions	of	prominent	Mendelians	to	their	formative	years	before	the	annus	mirabilis	1900.	A	promising	start	has	been	made	with	attempts	to	write	the	history	of	evolutionary	developmental	biology	(evo-devo),	epigenetics	and	of	stem	cell	research,	but	many	more	lacunae—such	as	the	continuing	influence	of	Nägeli	on	early	twentieth-century	colloid	research—need	to	be	filled	before	we	can	even	get	a	clearer	picture	of	how	pervasive	the	dominance	of	Mendelian	genetics	actually	was	in	the	biological	and	biomedical	sciences	of	the	twentieth	century.76	
A	further	aspect	waiting	to	be	elucidated	is	the	entanglement	of	heredity	with	politics.	Again,	this	may	come	as	a	surprise,	since	the	many	studies	that	exist	on	the	history	of	eugenics	and	scientific	racism	seem	to	evince	a	very	clear	connection	between	heredity	and	politics.	These	tend,	however,	to	understand	“biopolitics”—against	the	intentions	of	Michel	Foucault	who	introduced	the	term—as	a	politics	of	the	bureaucratic	nation	state	and	the	scientific	elites	it	coopted,	and	thus	conceal	how	concepts	of	inheritance	also	operate	on	the	more	mundane	level	of	families	and	property	transmission.	Heredity	itself	is	a	very	male	idea,	and	its	history	inseparable	from	the	history	of	patriarchy.77	Yet	it	is	rare	that	perspectives	from	gender	history	and	historical	anthropology	are																																																									75	Sapp	(1987);	Olby	(1989).	
76	Laubichler	and	Maienschein	(2007);	Barahona	et	al.	(2010);	Dröscher	(2014).	On	Nägeli	and	colloid	chemistry,	see	Liu	(2016,	ch.	4).		
77	Jordanova	(1995).	
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employed	in	the	study	of	heredity,	and	the	history	of	hereditarian	ideas	in	relevant	disciplines,	such	as	gynecology	and	pediatrics,	has	up	until	recently	hardly	figured	in	the	historiography	of	heredity.78	The	recent	expansion	of	the	cultural	history	of	heredity	to	a	more	inclusive	cultural	history	of	reproduction—no	doubt	motivated	by	the	rapid	development	of	new	reproductive	technologies—is	bound	to	open	up	of	new	avenues	of	historical	inquiry	in	this	respect,	and	historical	anthropologists	and	social	anthropologists	have	a	wealth	of	conceptual	tools	to	offer	for	such	inquiries.79	
A	final	area	in	the	cultural	history	of	heredity	of	which	we	know	too	little	concerns	ideas	and	practices	in	non-European	and	pre-modern	contexts.	To	wit,	various	attempts	to	explain	similarities	between	parents	and	their	children	are	well-covered	for	some	of	the	more	prominent	early	modern	natural	philosophers.80	However,	the	vast	domains	of	medical	and	agricultural	literature,	which	pre-modern	Europe	and	other	civilizations	such	as	the	Arab-Islamic	world	or	China	produced,	have	hardly	been	touched	upon	by	scholars	with	a	specific	view	on	heredity.81	One	may	argue	as	some	have	done,	including	the	author	of	this	chapter,	that	heredity	is	a	concept	that	simply	did	not	exist	outside	of	modern	Europe.	But	that	may	itself	just	reflect	a	historical	bias	that	was	brought	about	by	Mendel’s	discovery.		
																																																								78	See	Arni	(2015)	for	an	interesting	exception.	
79	Franklin	(2013);	Sabean	et	al.	(2013).	
80	Smith	(2006).	
81	For	notable	exceptions,	see	Lugt	(2004)	and	López-Beltrán	(2007).	
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